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ABSTRACT 
 
JULIA OSMAN: Citizen Warriors: French Perception of the American Military,  
1777-1779 
(Under the direction of Jay M. Smith) 
 
From examining reports of the American Revolution in French newspapers, this 
thesis evaluates the French perception of the American military from the beginning of the 
war until the French-American alliance in 1778.  During the 1770s, French officers and 
savants were referring to ancient sources to reform the military’s practical problems and 
flagging patriotism.  One officer, the Comte de Guibert, proposed the French adopt a 
“citizen army” as the ultimate solution.  In this context of reform, the American military 
appeared to epitomize the patriotism and success of the ancient militaries.  The hearty 
support of the American military that appeared in a government propaganda paper reveals 
the significance of the American image to the French government and European elite.  
During these early years of the American Revolution, the press coverage constructed an 
archetypal image of the American army and militia that informed French officers and 
enlightenment writers’ understanding of military operations and patriotism.   
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1777, a small French ship appropriately christened “La Victoire” sailed across 
the Atlantic Ocean, transporting Marie Joseph Paul Yves Roch Gilbert du Motier, 
Marquis de Lafayette, who impatiently waited for the ship to reach the American 
colonies.  The nineteen-year-old French nobleman had willingly left his expectant wife, 
young daughter, and pampered lifestyle in order to volunteer under General Washington 
and offer his military services to the Americans in their quest for liberty.  Louis XV had 
forbidden French soldiers or officers from involving themselves directly in the British-
American war, but Lafayette had surreptitiously arranged for a ship and crew and had 
slipped out of France unnoticed.  As he sailed across the Atlantic, he penned these words 
to his wife, describing his tender emotions towards the American people and his 
motivations to fight for the American cause. 
As a defender of that liberty which I adore, free myself beyond all others, 
coming as a friend to offer my services to this most interesting republic, I 
bring with me nothing but my own free heart and my own good will, no 
ambition to fulfill and no selfish interest to serve . . . The happiness of 
America is intimately connected with the happiness of all mankind; she is 
destined to become the safe and venerable asylum of virtue, of honesty, of 
tolerance, of equality, and of peaceful liberty.1
1 Marquis de Lafayette, letter to Madame Lafayette May 30, 1777 (La Victoire, 1777) in The Marquis de 
La Fayette in the American Revolution, ed. and trans. by Charlemagne Tower, Jr. (Freeport, New York: 
Books for Libraries Press, 1971), 58. 
 
6Lafayette was one of many French officers who fought in America during the 
Revolutionary War, though few of these officers expressed such enthusiasm for the 
American cause or achieved Lafayette’s level of success.2 After the war broke out in  
1775, several French officers, some with, some without, the permission of their King, 
sailed to America and volunteered to fight under General Washington.  In 1778, after 
clandestinely aiding the American army with supplies and monetary support, the French 
government agreed to send official military support.3 In 1780, the Comte de 
Rochambeau arrived in America with 5,500 troops and a small officer corps.  These 
French troops camped in Newport, Rhode Island for a year, then marched south to victory 
 
2 The only other volunteer who announced his purposes for going to America in the same manner was 
Louis-Philippe de Ségur.  See Gilbert Bodinier, Les Officiers de L’Armée Royale : combattants de la 
guerre d’Indépendance des Etats-Unis de Yorktown à l’an II (Chateau Vincennes : Service Historique de 
L’armée de Terre, 1983), 263.  Ségur details in his memoirs how he wished to join Lafayette in America as 
a volunteer, but his father would not allow it. Ségur eventually sailed to America in 1783, after the combat 
had concluded.  Louis Philippe, Comte de Ségur, Memoirs and Recollections, ed. Harmon Tupper and 
Harry W. Nerhood (New York: Arno Press and the New York Times, 1970), 104-110.  
 Under the Command of General Washington, Lafayette, who volunteered as a private, rose to the 
rank of Major General and received accolades for his military performance at the Battle of Brandywine.  
He developed a strong filial relationship with George Washington that continued until Washington’s death 
in 1799.  Because of his popularity in America, Lafayette became instrumental in orchestrating the French-
American military alliance, though his loyalty to the American army did not sit well with some of the 
French officers in Rochambeau’s army.  For a classic treatment of Lafayette in America, see Charlemagne 
Tower, The Marquis de Lafayette in the American Revolution with some account of the Attitude of France 
Toward the War of Independence (New York: Da Capo Press, 1970).  For an excellent examination of 
Lafayette’s relationship with America during the Revolution, see Lloyd Kramer, “America’s Lafayette and 
Lafayette’s America: A European and the American Revolution,” in The William and Mary Quarterly, 38 
(Apr., 1981): 228-241.  The largest and most well known account of Lafayette would be Louis Gottschalk’s 
six-volume series on Lafayette’s life from his arrival in America through the French Revolution.   Louis 
Gottschalk, Lafayette Comes to America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1935); Louis Gottschalk, 
Lafayette joins the American Army (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1937); Louis Gottschalk, 
Lafayette and the Close of the American Revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942).   
 
3 Congress initially sent Thomas Mason, a skilled merchant marine, to l’Orient (today known as Lorient) 
in 1775 to purchase arms from the French.  His providers were reluctant to supply them, fearing the British 
would discover the exchange.  See Henry Pleasants, Jr. “Contraband from Lorient,” in Military Analysis of 
the Revolutionary War, ed. by the Editors of Military Affairs (New York: KTO press, 1977).  Congress had 
greater success in 1776, when French merchants used a secret French trading company called Roderique 
Hortalez and Co. to send aid to the colonies without the Britain’s knowledge. This company was created 
and directed by Pierre Augustin Caron de Beaumarchais, who negotiated with Silas Dean, the American 
representative to France for the appropriation of supplies, to use the company to supply the American 
military during the early years of the war.  For a thorough and fascinating account of Beaumarchais and his 
covert trading operations, see Brian M. Morton and Donald C. Spinelli, Beaumarchais in the American 
Revolution (New York: Lexington Books, 2003).  
7at Yorktown in 1781, where they fought alongside the American forces for the first and 
last time.  Following the battle, the French army remained in America for two years until 
the Treaty of Paris formally ended the war in 1783.   
Considering the extensive wars that devoured French resources throughout the 
eighteenth century, the American Revolution, which involved only five years of official 
French participation and a few thousand troops, hardly counts as one of the most notable 
chapters in French military history.  Yet because the French Revolution followed closely 
on the heels of the American Revolution, scholars believe that there is an evident 
connection between the two.  Colin Jones, for example, suggests that patriotism and 
liberty were somehow “transplanted” from America to France.  He even assumes the 
“career soldiers” who served in the American Revolution were “transformed by their 
involvement in the struggle for American freedom.”4 However, despite what appears to 
be an evident connection, scholars cannot seem to find a direct link between the two 
Revolutions.  Samuel Scott set out to demonstrate that the French military had 
transported Revolutionary ideas from America to France, but his work revealed that with 
the exception of Lafayette, most of the French officers who participated in the American 
war opposed the French Revolution.  The opinions of the French soldiers who 
participated in the American Revolution are currently unknown, as their documents are 
maddeningly few. 5 Of the American Revolutionary veterans, Lafayette was one of the 
 
4 Colin Jones, The Great Nation: France from Louis XV to Napoleon (New York: Penguin Press, 2002), 
301-310. 
 
5 The one known study of the French foot soldiers in the American Revolution is Forrest McDonald, 
“The Relation of the French Peasant Veterans of the American Revolution to the Fall of Feudalism in 
France 1789-1792,” in Agricultural History Magazine 25 (Oct., 1951): 145-161.  This article found a 
correlation between the provinces of France that were the most violent in 1789 and the provinces where 
most of the American Revolutionary veterans resided.  He concluded that the American Revolution 
8few inspired by his experience in America to put his new revolutionary ideas into practice 
upon his return to France.  
This difficulty in establishing a connection between the two Revolutions seems to 
go hand in hand with scholars’ criticism of the French volunteers and officers who fought 
under Rochambeau.  Gilbert Bodinier and Scott have argued convincingly that the French 
officers had no motivation other than self-interest or duty in following orders.6 Even 
Lafayette came under attack from scholars who portrayed him not as the valiant, self-
sacrificing hero of the American and French Revolutions, but as politically clumsy and 
militarily inept.  The soldiers and officers of Rochambeau’s army were not informed until 
after their ship departed the coasts of France that they would be fighting in America.7
French volunteers were mostly professional soldiers with little overt ideological interest 
in the American war who wished to distinguish themselves in battle or escape debts 
incurred in France.8 The Chevalier de Pontgibaud, for example, was in prison shortly 
before leaving for America, because his aunt had accused him of trying to poison his 
father.  After escaping prison, Pontgibaud reconciled with his father, who instructed his 
 
inspired French peasants to end economic feudalism.  However, such a correlation can have numerous 
explanations, and few scholars consider MacDonald’s conclusion convincing. 
 
6 Gilbert Bodinier has conducted the most thorough research to date on the French volunteers and 
officers under Rochambeau who fought in America.  In his exhaustive studies of the French officers, 
Bodinier determined that the majority of volunteers were professional soldiers looking for work in a rare 
period of European peacetime.  
 
7 Samuel Scott, From Yorktown to Valmy (Colorado: University Press of Colorado, 1998), 7. 
 
8 For a complete reference of French volunteers and their motives, see Bodinier, Les Officiers de 
L’Armée Royale, 263, 281, 297.  For a compilation of all the volunteers and their backgrounds, see André 
Lasseray, Les Français sous les Treize Etoiles, 1775-83 (Imprimerie Protat frères; à Paris, 1935) and 
Gilbert Bodinier, Dictionnaire des officiers de l’armée qui ont combattu aux Etats-Unis pendant la Guerre 
d’Indépendance, 1776-1783 (Vincennes : Service historique de l’Armée de Terre, 1983).  
 
9son to volunteer with the colonial army in America and regain his honor.9 The American 
Revolution, therefore, served as a means for French volunteers to gain glory and honor 
for their personal benefit; very little about America itself seems to have interested them.   
Does this apparent lack of interest in the American cause necessarily indicate that 
the American Revolution held no ideological significance for the French military?   And 
does the absence of an obvious ‘smoking gun’ indicate there is no military connection 
between the American and French Revolutions?  The environment of the educated elite in 
France during the outbreak of the American Revolution indicates that French officers did 
have an ideological interest in the American war, albeit not a socio-political one of 
freedom and equality.  After all, volunteers who came to America desiring to distinguish 
themselves on the battlefield expressed military ideals.  Lloyd Kramer recently argued 
against the cynicism one encounters in present-day scholarship and restored some of 
Lafayette’s heroic characteristics. 10 Perhaps it is time to reconsider the motives of other 
French officers who fought in America, as well.  While these officers’ motives might 
appear selfish or foolhardy when viewed in isolation, in the context of the French military 
and moral crisis of the eighteenth century, they are recast in a more ideological light.  As 
Durand Echeverria so aptly stated, in France “the [American] image was a reflection not 
of reality but of domestic preoccupations,” and in the 1770s, France was preoccupied 
with military and moral reform.11 
9 Hugh Rankin, Narratives of the American Revolution (Chicago: Donnelly Sons and Co., 1976), 213-
214. 
 10 Lloyd Kramer applied one of Hayden White’s observations to the historians of Lafayette, specifically 
that the nineteenth century was a Romantic era in which history was full of heroes.  The twentieth century 
consequently adopted a cynical view of history.  Lloyd Kramer, Lafayette in Two Worlds (Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 1-6. 
 
11 Durand Echeverria, Mirage of the West: A History of the French Image of American Society to 1815 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), 78.  Echeverria provided the foundational work on the 
10
During the eighteenth century, and particularly during the 1770s, the French army 
engaged in a reform movement to address the various moral and practical problems that 
afflicted their military and cost them severe losses in the Seven Years’ War.  Among 
other weaknesses, the French military suffered from incompetent officers, poorly trained 
troops, and flagging patriotism.    Reformers studied the successful military 
accomplishments and patriotic fervor of the ancient Greeks and Romans in search of a 
suitable model for the French military to emulate.  As depicted in French literature, 
ancient militaries utilized successful tactics, employed talented and skillful commanders, 
and were most of all motivated by a deep sense of patriotism.  One representative figure, 
Jacques-Antoine Hippolyte, the Comte de Guibert, a French army officer whose ideas 
were popular in both military and wider educated circles, promoted a new military 
structure based on the success of the ancients.  In his Essai Général de Tactique, Guibert 
used the examples of Rome and Sparta to conclude that the French military needed to 
become a citizen army—an army consisting of every individual able to carry arms, ready 
and willing to fight for France—in order to overcome its difficulties.  In particular, 
Guibert argued that patriotism, as exemplified by the ancients, would naturally ameliorate 
military problems by motivating troops and officers alike to defend their country.  
Guibert’s proposal for a citizen army was received with wild enthusiasm from military 
thinkers and philosophes alike as a potential anecdote to cure the French military of its 
tactical and motivational failings. 
Within this widespread atmosphere of military reform, the two most popular 
newspapers in France, the Gazette de Leyde and Gazette de France, printed articles 
 
French perspective of the American Revolution and Early Republic, and focuses on philosophical, political, 
and social perceptions, but does not look directly at either the French or American military. 
11
portraying the American military as the ideal citizen army that naturally avoided the 
practical and moral challenges plaguing its French counterpart.  The American 
Revolution piqued military reformers’ interest, as the Americans employed various 
tactical, organizational, and inspirational methods reminiscent of the ancients.12 In 
particular, the American military appeared to exemplify citizen warfare as described by 
Guibert.  French officers, attuned to ideas of reform and seeking evidence to support the 
possibility of citizen warfare, filtered the reports of America through this frame of 
reference.   
In addition to these two popular newspapers, examining Les Affaires de 
l’Angleterre et de l’Amérique, a third newspaper published by the French government, 
reveals the extensive influence and the broad appeal of the American military as a citizen 
army.  French interest in the American military was not just a temporary trend, but had 
powerful implications for the future of the French military and government.  When read 
from the perspective of military reform, these three newspapers can convey French 
perceptions of the American army and militia and illustrate how this image epitomized 
the French army’s military ideals.  
 In exploring the specifics of how this interest in military reform crafted the 
American image, I will look at the Gazette de France and the Gazette de Leyde from the 
beginning of the American War in 1775—and the Affaires de l’Angleterre et de 
l’Amerique, from its first publication in 1776—until the official military alliance in 
February of 1778 that bound France and America in a common destiny.  During these 
 
12 For excellent descriptions of how the American militia demonstrated the French ideal of a “natural 
army” and preceded the Levée en Masse which occurred during the French Revolution, see Orville T. 
Murphy, “The Concept of the Levée en Masse,” and “French Soldier’s Opinion of the American Militia,” in 
Military Analysis of the Revolutionary War, ed. by the Editors of Military Affairs (New York: KTO press, 
1977).   
12
early years of the American Revolution, the press coverage constructed an archetypal 
image of the American army and militia that informed French officers and enlightenment 
writers’ understanding of military operations and patriotism. 
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CHAPTER II 
SOCIAL AND MILITARY REFORM 
 
Military Crisis and Transition 
 
When the American War began in 1775, the French military was already engaged 
in a two-front conflict with itself, attempting to reform both the practical aspects of the 
French military that accounted for failure on the battlefield, as well as moral failings of 
the French nobility, which resulted in a flagging sense of morale and patriotism.13 
Though these conditions had been slowly building since the early eighteenth century, the 
French army’s embarrassing defeats during the Seven Years’ War exposed the lack of 
competence among the officer corps and lack of aptitude among the troops.  Officers did 
not merit their ranks, soldiers did not receive sufficient training, and the military lacked a 
central system that explicitly defined uniform military policies.  Reformers busily 
concocted plans that would improve military performance without disrupting the 
military’s place in the French social structure, but by 1775 these reformers had not 
succeeded in implementing all the necessary changes.   
 According to recent scholarship, the principal factors behind the inefficiency of 
the officer corps were overcrowded ranks and lack of experience.  Since the Middle 
Ages, the leadership of the military had rested with the nobility, an elite group of warriors 
whose families had defended France for generations.  By the eighteenth century, there 
was a widespread perception that the nobility should no longer have exclusive control 
 
13 In discussing the French nobility, it is important to remember that not all nobles lacked military 
competence and values.  Members of the noble class varied in wealth, status, experience, education, and 
world-view.  Indeed, the nobility’s greatest critics of these moral and military failings were nobles 
themselves.  Therefore, when I mention problems within “the nobility,” or among “nobles,” I am referring 
only to the perception of widescale problems among the nobility. 
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over the officer corps, as many nobles lacked the necessary experience, expertise, and 
military interest to merit their ranks.  As the disparity in wealth increased within the 
nobility, many feared that the deciding factor in military promotion had shifted from 
talent and experience to the financial ability of the officer to adequately outfit his soldiers 
and fund the campaign.  Because high military rank indicated high social rank, and 
because Louis XV used the military as a means of rewarding court favorites, the officer 
corps became bloated with inept nobles vying with each other for military positions and 
the corresponding status.  The competition among the noble officers for key positions 
bred personal animosities that interfered with decisions on the battlefield.14 Junior 
officers who managed to obtain a regiment were generally more concerned about their 
own popularity and the deference of their troops than about training and discipline.15 
Accustomed to extravagant living, the young officers overwhelmed their regiments with 
excessive baggage trains in an attempt to maintain a court lifestyle on the campaign.16 
Because of the misplaced priorities in the court culture of Louis XV, wealth and status 
trumped training and discipline. 
As a result of such unprofessional behavior among the officers, the troops were 
undisciplined, ill-trained, and given to desertion.  While scholars are currently taking a 
fresh look at the social constitution of the French infantry, the most recent academic 
 
14 See Emile G. Léonard, L’Armée et ses Problèmes au XVIIIe Siècle (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1958), 174-
175. 
 
15 See Rafe Blaufarb, “Noble Privilege and Absolutist State Building: French Military Administration 
after the Seven Years’ War,” French Historical Studies 24 (Spring 2001): 223-246, 236. 
 
16 Excessive baggage on the campaign not only slowed the army and created logistical problems, it 
signified the officers’ misplaced priorities and their inadequacy as military leaders.  French writers 
condemned the dependence on “le luxe,” luxury, as one of the greatest problems of the nobility.  For 
example, Mably, a leading writer of the eighteenth century, argued that “luxury softens the leaders.”  
Gabriel Bonnot, abbé de Mably, “Entretiens de Phocion, sur le rapport de la morale avec la politique,” 
Oeuvres complètes de l’abbé de Mably, vol. 10 (Londres, 1789), 289. 
 
15
consensus accepts the view of the army’s eighteenth-century critics, who depicted the 
typical soldier as either an indifferent mercenary or an apathetic conscript.  The majority 
of the French troops had little interest in cause and country, and had similarly little 
motivation to stay in the army if their pay arrived too late or the training seemed too 
rigorous.  As non-nobles, foot soldiers received insufficient pay and had little hope for 
advancement.  In an effort to keep the soldiers from deserting, young officers hesitated to 
enforce discipline or train the troops too rigorously.  This approach only weakened the 
troops on the battlefield, who were unable to perform basic maneuvers and continued to 
desert.17 With little incentive for the troops to stay, desertion was, as Corvisier describes 
it, the “true curse” of the military.18 
Lee Kennett and Rafe Blaufarb point to the lack of a central system within the 
military as the root of these problems.  Since no official set of policies and procedures 
existed to instruct the officers about army operations, coordinating the various regiments 
for a battle proved nearly impossible.  Power constantly shifted among the top ranks of 
the military, leaving the operation of the army to the numerous lower-ranking officers.19 
According to Blaufarb, regiments relied on a system of “private administration,” in which 
the officers, usually captains, had complete control over their own companies, without 
necessarily communicating with their fellow officers about training techniques and 
maneuvers.20 The government did not provide a central base or barracks for the troops, 
 
17 Blaufarb, “Noble Privilege and Absolutist State Building,” 235. 
 
18 André Corvisier, L’Armée Française de la fin du XVIIe siècle au ministère de Choiseul, 2 vols. 
(Paris : Presses Universitaires de France,1964), 693. 
 
19 Kennett, The French Army during the Seven Years’ War, 10. 
 
20 In eighteenth-century France, captains literally “owned” their companies, because they had to 
purchase all the supplies for their company and provide salaries for all the soldiers.  French companies 
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and when not campaigning during winter months and interwar periods, captains often 
dispersed their troops throughout the countryside in search of provisions.  When the 
troops scattered, regular training and discipline disintegrated, causing high rates of 
desertion.21 Without an official policy that united all aspects of the military under a 
uniform command, the misguided regiments could not function on the battlefield as a 
single military machine.22 
As these embarrassing qualities of the French military came to light during the 
Seven Years’ War, the nobility questioned the nature of its role in society and the values 
that the noble class theoretically represented.  Because the nobility traditionally served 
the state by conducting warfare, their estate corresponded to the values of patriotism, 
honor, and virtue.  Simultaneous with military failings, French men of letters pointed out 
discrepancies between supposed values and the actual behavior of many members of the 
nobility.  Rather than serve the state selflessly, for the good of fellow citizens, 
contemporary French writers argued that the monarchy had trained the nobility to serve 
the state for the promise of personal glory and gain.   Hoping to rekindle lost values, 
scholars looked to the ancient Greeks and Romans as models of military virtue.  The 
ancient model of patriotism, based on an overpowering love of the patrie, threw into 
sharp contrast the French nobility’s self-serving reputation, and it seemed unlikely that 
 
were therefore usually comparatively small, averaging about 40 men per company, whereas a Prussian 
company consisted of as many as 115 men.  See Blaufarb, “Noble Privilege and Absolutist State Building,” 
234. 
 
21 Ibid., 235. 
 
22 For more details about the mechanics of eighteenth-century warfare, see John Lynn, “States in 
Conflict” in Warfare: the Triumph of the West, ed. Geoffrey Parker (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995), 164-178, and Christopher Duffy, The Military Experience in the Age of Reason (New York: 
Atheneum, 1988). 
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the French nobility as a whole could ever conform to Roman or Spartan ideals.23 
Through constant references to ancient military ethics, eighteenth-century French authors 
and noblemen sought to reinstate the noble values of patriotism, honor, and virtue into a 
nobility that had too long operated without them. 
 In an effort to combat the more practical problems that beset the French military, 
several government officials and high-ranking military officers initiated immediate 
reforms following the Seven Years’ War.  Jean-Baptiste Donatien de Vimeur, Marquis de 
Rochambeau, a high-ranking noble and future military commander of the French forces 
in America, proposed reforms that were not based on a behavioral or moral change with 
the officer corps.  Rather, he suggested a complicated method of awarding rank, one in 
which the lower ranks within the officer corps were the exclusive privilege of the 
nobility.  Though his proposal did not require any sacrifices or changes from the officers, 
it was not considered a viable reform and existed only on paper.24 
Etienne-François, duc de Choiseul, the Minister of War, managed to pass several 
effective reforms that did require some officers to make sacrifices.  In 1762, Choiseul 
removed the military from the realm of private administration, by making the army’s 
financial requirements the burden of the state, rather than that of the individual officer.  
He hoped that by financing the regiments, rank would depend less on individual wealth 
and more on the individual’s military abilities. 25 Choiseul also decreased the size of the 
officer corps, a necessary, if unpopular move.  In order to give the soldiers a greater sense 
 
23 Jay Smith, Nobility Reimagined: the Patriotic Nation in Eighteenth Century France (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2005), 95. 
 
24 Jay Smith, The Culture of Merit (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 246-
248. 
 
25 Blaufarb, “Noble Privilege and Absolutist State Building,” 237. 
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of purpose, he required them to swear an oath of loyalty to the king, effectively making 
them the “king’s soldiers,” rather than the property of their captain.  Finally, he required 
all non-commissioned officers to be literate, thus providing more educated and capable 
enlisted leaders. 26 Unfortunately for Choiseul, the factionalism and intrigue of Louis 
XV’s court eventually resulted in his dismissal in 1770.  Once Choiseul lost his position 
as Minister of War, his reforms, essential for the improvement of the French military, 
were reversed.  The French military needed practical and moral reforms alike, but by the 
late 1760’s, many observers agreed that practical military reform could not take place 
without first initiating reforms that addressed the poor state of military values.27 
Guibert and Citizen Warfare 
 
Jacques-Antoine Hippolyte, the Comte de Guibert, inspired new methods of 
reform among the nobility and the military when he penned his Essai Général de 
Tactique, a work addressing both the practical measures of military reform as well as the 
moral crisis of French society.   Building on an established literature of patriotic reform, 
the Essai spoke to a wide audience, from philosophes to military commanders, and 
gauging from his instant popularity upon the circulation of his text in 1771, Guibert 
managed to appeal to both groups simultaneously. 28 Guibert’s extensive military 
 
26 Léonard, L’Armée et ses Problèmes au XVIIIe Siècle, 241. 
 
27 For more examples on the types of reforms attempted in the 1770s, see David D. Bien, “The Army in 
the French Enlightenment: Reform, Reaction, and Revolution,” Past and Present, 85 (Nov., 1979): 68-98. 
 
28 In writing his Essai, Guibert added to an established literature that discussed French patriotism, 
values, and honor, using the Ancient Greeks and Romans as models for moral reform.  Some of the more 
prominent authors that Guibert borrowed from and dialogued with include Nicolò Machiavelli, 
Montesquieu, Mably, Rousseau, and Fénelon.  Unlike his predecessors, Guibert utilized the classical 
revival and search for patriotism in order to garner the interest of Enlightenment thinkers in the 
contemporary French military.  He successfully wedded the philosophic sphere with the military sphere, 
demonstrating how the improvement of one depended on the other. 
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observations and interactions gave him the credibility necessary for his proposal.  Guibert 
was a member of the nobility, and his father was able to secure for him the rank of 
lieutenant at the age of thirteen.  During the Seven Years’ War, Guibert accompanied the 
renowned general, duc de Broglie, on campaign and witnessed first-hand the French 
army’s disastrous defeat at the battle of Rossbach in 1757.  With respect to organizational 
and ethical issues, Guibert helped his father implement some of Choiseul’s reforms 
during the early 1760’s.  By the conclusion of the Seven Years’ War, Guibert was well 
qualified to address the problems facing the French army, and he argued for a complete 
transformation of the military. 29 Breaking away from the European system of dynastic 
warfare, Guibert argued that the military should become a citizen army, which he 
believed would solve France’s military and moral crisis. 
Instead of employing professional soldiers or recruiting conscripts, a citizen army 
called for the mobilization of the entire population in times of war.  During times of 
peace, these citizens laid aside their arms and returned to their daily occupations.  This 
idea resonated for those who had learned of Cincinnatus, the Roman general who 
returned to his farm after fighting for the Empire.  Guibert’s vision of a citizen army 
included a “vigorous militia . . . consisting of contented citizens who are interested in 
defending their prosperous state.”  He argued that neighboring nations would not wish to 
disturb its tranquility, but,  
 
29 For works discussing Guibert and his Essai Général de Tactique, see François Emmanuel Vicomte de 
Toulongeon, preface to Journal d’un voyage en Allemagne, fait en 1773, by Jacques-Antoine Hyppolyte de 
Guibert (Paris : Treuttel et Würtz, 1803), 1-85.  A work that places Guibert in the context of seventeenth 
and eighteenth-century French military history is R.R. Palmer, “Frederick, Guibert, Bülow,” in Makers of 
Modern Strategy, ed. Peter Paret, 2nd ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1986), 105-113.  For a brief 
biography of Guibert, see Henri Ménard, preface to Ecrits Militaires by Jaques Antoine Hippolyte de 
Guibert (Paris: Copernic Press, 1977), 15-52. 
 
20
if finally, despite [the citizen-soldier’s] moderation, he is in someway 
violated, in his affairs, his land, or his honor, he will make war.  But when 
he makes war, it will be with the full exertion of his power; it will be with 
the firm resolution not to lay down his weapons until he has been paid 
reparation in proportion to the offense.  His method of war will not be like 
the method that most states have adopted today.  He will not want to 
conquer, but only preserve what is rightfully his. . . . Terrible in his anger, 
he will bring to his enemy fire and sword.  With his vengeance, he will 
frighten all the people who are tempted to disturb his peaceful state.  This 
will not be barbaric, his violation of the superficial laws of war, for these 
reprisals are founded on the laws of nature.  [Once offended], he rises, he 
leaves his hearth.  He will perish, until the last man if necessary.  But he 
will obtain satisfaction, he will avenge himself, he will assure, by the 
lightening of his vengeance, his future peace . . . 30 
In proposing this new approach to warfare, Guibert presented a solution to the 
military and moral crisis plaguing France.  By placing the duty of warfare in the hands of 
French citizens, Guibert suggested distancing the military from the nobility; the army 
would no longer serve as a gauge for social celebrity but instead exist purely for defense.  
Guibert’s citizen army would therefore avoid the cumbersome baggage trains that court 
nobles “needed” on the campaign.  Nor could the monarch use positions in the military as 
a means to reward his court favorites, placing unqualified individuals in positions of high 
rank.  Rather than fighting amongst themselves for royal favors, officers and soldiers 
alike would work toward a common cause, not for their personal glory, but for the 
defense of their patrie. Because a citizen army would not rely on mercenaries or 
conscripts, but on citizens motivated by love for their country, the army would not suffer 
from desertion, nor require a great deal of financial assistance from individuals or the 
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state. Patriotism, a deep and sincere love of the patrie, was the essential ingredient if this 
type of military were to succeed. 31 
Promoting French patriotism would lay the foundation for  moral and military 
reform by making service to the patrie its own reward.  Guibert’s citizen army operated 
only in defense of the nation for the promise of “future tranquility.”  Because Guibert 
restricted warfare to the borders of France, monarchs would not have to invent incentives 
for his nobles to fight on foreign lands.  Instead, the threat of being conquered would be 
the primary motivation for people to fight in defense of their country.  Patriotic warfare 
would be more personal, as the citizens would be fighting directly to defend their families 
and property.  The disciplined training required of foot soldiers to effectively execute line 
warfare would not be necessary in a citizen army, because citizens would fight in a more 
“natural” style akin to guerilla warfare.  If the citizens fought so heartily for their own 
defense, then merit, not social rank, would determine which individuals organized and 
commanded the military.   By fighting only defensive wars, and calling on all citizens to 
take an equal part in the protection of their country, France would eliminate its moral and 
military problems.   
Guibert recognized the implausibility of this ideal state, and admitted that 
European states had little interest in citizen warfare.  Having a citizen army required 
arming the citizenry, and monarchical European governments of the eighteenth century 
feared revolts. 32 Guibert further recognized that European governments would probably 
continue their attempts to gain additional power and expand their territories.  Despite the 
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reality of Europe’s current situation, Guibert indicated in his Essai that Europe could 
change, and that France would provide the example.  Addressing his patrie, Guibert 
encouraged his nation to adopt a patriotic system, reasoning that “[t]his vision will 
perhaps not always be a fantastic dream.  It could be realized in you.” 33 
To the modern reader, Guibert’s ideas may seem too idealistic to have been taken 
seriously, but his Essai found a strong following in France. As the ultimate mark of 
approval in philosophic society, Voltaire praised the text as “a work of genius.”34 
Guibert’s Essai made him an instant celebrity among the upper nobility and educated 
elite, and he quickly embraced the life of a French philosophe. Guibert succeeded in 
popularizing the military reforms among the educated classes, and he united the 
objectives of military and moral reform, pointing to patriotism as the key to improving 
the incompetent, corrupted and unmotivated French army. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
THE PRESS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
 
Reporting on the American War 
 While the educated elite in France contemplated and criticized society’s moral 
shortcomings and military failings, a revolution erupted across the Atlantic, and the 
French elite followed the events with great interest.  The majority of educated French 
society probably learned of the American war (as well as the events leading up to it) by 
reading the Gazette de Leyde or Gazette de France, the two leading newspapers in 
France.  The Gazette de France was a court paper printed under the supervision of the 
French government.  It primarily described court activities, new regulations that 
warranted public attention, and international events, but reported very little on domestic 
affairs.  Despite some discrepancies in the factual information of the paper, which would 
discredit it as a reliable source according to modern standards, the Gazette was generally 
recognized as an authoritative source for political news.  It was often the first source to 
print international information and thus provided its readers with their initial impressions.  
In addition to its reliability (by eighteenth-century standards), the Gazette de France was 
cheaper than other papers and enjoyed a reputation for prompt reporting. 35 
The other major newspaper in eighteenth-century France was a French-language 
paper printed in the Netherlands called the Gazette de Leyde. This Gazette served an 
 
35 Jeremy Popkin, News and Politics in the Age of the Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1989), 47, 48. 
 
24
international audience and was not written under the gaze of a government, making its 
news on French domestic affairs comparatively more reliable.  Thanks to its timely 
reporting and international correspondents, by 1750 the Gazette de Leyde was the top-
selling newspaper in Europe.36 Jean Luzac, the editor of the paper during the 1770s, 
sympathized with the American cause, often giving news from Britain and America 
precedence over reports from other regions.  In reporting American events, he relied 
heavily on American correspondents in Europe.  One of his contacts, Charles Dumas, 
who represented the American cause in the Netherlands at the Hague, communicated 
regularly with Luzac and encouraged other American representatives in Europe, such as 
Silias Dean and Benjamin Franklin, to send their correspondence to Luzac for 
publication.37 Indeed, Luzac’s friendship with John Adams and George Washington 
sealed his legacy, as “during the War of [American] Independence, a war that 
impassioned the general esprit, he was receiving from America the first and most 
accurate news.”38 Although the Gazette de France was the more popular newspaper in 
France, the Gazette de Leyde printed more detailed information and had greater freedom 
in choosing what to print.   
 It is difficult to assess the exact number of readers, since one newspaper would 
pass through an indeterminate number of hands at a café, salon, club, or private 
residence, but the Gazette de France and Gazette de Leyde together sold nearly 15,000 
copies twice a week, a sufficient number to ensure widespread readership among the 
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elite.39 Only the wealthy could afford a yearly subscription to the Gazette de Leyde,
limiting its readership to the higher levels of society.40 Because both papers were costly 
and catered to those with an interest in politics, it is safe to assume that wealthy court 
nobles and high-ranking military officials would have been regular readers of the two 
gazettes.
In reporting news on foreign affairs, both newspapers often relied on articles in 
other periodicals, letters, and official documents, which they either summarized or 
reprinted in full, usually over the course of several weeks.  In some instances, reporters 
did not provide the sources for particular information, although at other times the 
reporters went to great lengths to present all available sources in an article.  When they 
received conflicting information, both newspapers carefully chose which version to 
report and alerted the readers to these discrepancies or presented both conflicting sources.  
The Gazette de France admitted that “[o]ur published papers always contain facts which 
are difficult to reconcile.”  Similarly, the Gazette de Leyde wrote that “the public will 
read avidly” any articles on the American war, even if the contradicting reports made 
“the news from America  . . . unsuitable for publication.”41 Regardless of the accuracy of 
some of their sources, both gazettes felt pressure from the readership to print more news 
on the American Revolution and demonstrated similar tendencies in their treatment of it.   
The image the newspapers sculpted of the American military was partially shaped 
by the literary styles and Republican rhetoric of the eighteenth century.  The journalists 
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reporting and propagating the favorable American image were as steeped in the rhetoric 
of Greek and Roman patriotism as the officers who read their reports; even outside the 
military, eighteenth-century French literature abounded in references to the ancients.  
Rousseau’s First Discourse, for example, examined the conflicting roles of art and 
military science in Greek and Roman society and concluded that the French should learn 
from those examples and focus on military training before the arts. 42 In his 
Considerations on the Government of Poland, Rousseau encouraged his countrymen to 
“build strong citadels in the hearts of the citizens” like Sparta, and emulate the Romans’ 
public displays of patriotic fervor.43 Gabriel Bonnot, abbé de Mably likewise linked the 
rampant luxury in the French military to the death of patriotism.44 In representing the 
American Revolution, these newspapers were also employing prevalent literary styles.  
The language they used closely resembled the language of Guibert, which signified that 
these reporters were well-versed in the literary conventions of the time period.  This 
literary frame of reference does not completely explain the individual journalists’ 
intentions when they penned the articles, but it does suggest that the reporters already had 
a model in mind when they received the scattered information from America.  When 
piecing the information into a report, or translating letters or Congressional resolutions, 
they used the classical republican lens already popular in French literature and 
philosophy. 
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While the extent of the American military’s influence on the newspapers cannot 
be known, in examining Washington’s correspondence, it is apparent that the Americans 
knew of and protected their image abroad.  According to Bernard Bailyn’s study of 
American Revolutionary pamphlets, Americans identified themselves with the Greeks 
and Romans of antiquity and saw the ancients as “illustrative” of their thoughts and 
actions.45 Concerning the specific perceptions of the American military abroad, the 
Americans did not so much construct this image as safeguard it.  In a letter dated shortly 
before the British attack on Philadelphia, Lafayette counseled Washington to combat the 
British without the aid of the militia in order to preserve the powerful image of America’s 
citizen army.  Lafayette understood that if his countrymen discovered that the American 
militia was not nearly as successful as the newspapers reported, the Americans could lose 
all hope of foreign aid and recognition.  He informed Washington,   
Europe has a great idea of our ability to raise when we please an immense 
army of militia, and it is looked upon as our last but certain resource.  If 
we fall this phantom will also fall and you know that the American 
interest has always been that since the beginning of this war to let the 
world believe that we are stronger than we ever expect to be.46 
The Americans, as far as we know, had little control over the information that the 
newspapers chose to print, but they were aware of their image in Europe and understood 
the need to safeguard it as much as possible.47 
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Given that these newspapers provided the reading public with the most detailed, 
consistent, and up-to-date reports from abroad, analysis of their contents can help to 
establish the general impression that most educated Frenchmen would have formed of the 
American military.  Although the papers are replete with inaccuracies, their accounts of 
the American war—reports of battles, descriptions of the military, pertinent 
Congressional resolutions—allow us to reconstruct French perceptions of the American 
army and militia and the ways in which that perception conditioned and was conditioned 
by the context of the French moral and military crisis.  What we see is that French readers 
would have formed an impression of the American military that matched Guibert’s 
portrayal of citizen warfare. 
Press Representations of the American Army and Militia  
 
When one views the two gazettes’ reports of America from a perspective firmly 
rooted in the moral and military reforms of the 1770s, the American army and militia 
appear to fit the mold of Guibert’s model citizen army to a startling degree.  A citizen 
army, as Guibert presented it to the French nobility and as the American military 
appeared to embody it, involved a sense of mutual support, patriotism, and self-sacrifice.  
According to Guibert, love of country and family sufficiently motivated citizens to 
defend their country and refrain from wars of conquest.  When repulsing the enemy, 
citizen soldiers used all available resources in a type of warfare that corresponded to the 
“laws of nature,” involving unconventional tactics.  Guibert concluded, as did the papers 
reporting on the American Revolution, that a nation equipped with such a powerful and 
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passionate army could not be defeated. 48 Generally speaking, the American officers and 
soldiers as presented in the newspapers seemed to avoid the problems plaguing French 
military personnel.  Additionally, reports of congressional resolutions illustrated some of 
the American government’s approaches to organizing and administering an effective 
citizen army.  Towards the end of 1777, the American image became associated with the 
ancients that French writers encouraged their own people to emulate. 
 When one considers the French impression of the American army and militia, it is 
important to note that in the early years of the American Revolution (until news arrived 
of the Declaration of Independence), French newspapers represented the Americans as 
actively seeking reconciliation with England.  In these accounts, the colonists fought 
purely for the rights and liberties that they merited as Englishmen, not for independence 
from a monarchy.  According to the papers, only citizens in Boston demonstrated any 
revolutionary or anti-monarchical sentiment, whereas the remainder of the colonists made 
a point of proclaiming their allegiance to the Crown.  The Gazette de France quoted one 
of Washington’s letters to Congress announcing that, 
While the faithful subjects of the King, by respect for the laws, and the 
same for the constitution, in virtue of which His Majesty is seated on the 
Throne of England, we take upon ourselves the sad necessity of taking up 
arms for the defense of our rights and our privileges, and that at the same 
time we deplore the calamities of this divided Empire . . . according to the 
voices of all good Americans, this great quarrel concludes in our 
reconciliation with the Mother Country. 49 
The Gazette de Leyde further printed parts of Congressional correspondence in which 
John Hancock, the President of Congress, continually referred to the American citizens as 
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“faithful subjects of His Majesty.”50 Therefore, at the outset of the American war, the 
perceived reasons behind the conflict had little to do with challenging the monarchy, and 
more with re-establishing certain rights and privileges that the British colonists merited 
by right of being Englishmen.  Reports that describe the American military are not 
concerned with the politically ideological implications of the Revolution, but rather focus 
on military performance and the success of a citizen army.  
 According to Guibert, citizen armies could only fight defensive wars, and 
beginning with the Battles of Concord and Lexington, both newspapers cast the British 
army in the role of the aggressor and the colonial army and militias as the defenders, 
fighting valiantly for their rights.  While neither paper described either side in such 
explicit terms, one can infer these respective roles from the accounts of battles, wartime 
atrocities, and congressional resolutions that the newspapers chose to print.  In reporting 
on the Battle of Lexington, the Gazette de France printed sections of a letter that the 
Provincial Congress of New England addressed to the inhabitants of Great Britain, 
explaining the cause for the conflict and placing the blame squarely on the shoulders of 
the British army.  The letter recounted several inhabitants of Massachusetts, strolling 
peacefully from Boston on the road to Lexington, when British soldiers from General 
Gage’s army attacked them.  The Lexington militia came to these citizens’ defense, and 
sent a hundred men to fight against at least 900 British soldiers.51 The Gazette de Leyde 
presented a different translation of the same letter and included a graphic description of 
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the atrocities that the British supposedly committed against American citizens following 
the battle: 
It would be very difficult, if not impossible, to give a detailed 
account of the ravages that the [British] troops committed during their 
retreat from Concord to Charlestown.  Suffice to say, that a great number 
of houses on the way were pillaged and destroyed, some of them were 
burned, women who were in their beds were chased naked down the road 
by the [British] soldiers, who killed old men in cold blood in their homes; 
in a word, the [British] troops gave to this occasion scenes of horror so 
dark, that they would dishonor the annals of even the most barbaric 
nations. 52 
Having reported this dramatic event, the Gazette de Leyde added that London 
awaited news from General Gage for his account of the matter, which it duly printed in 
the next issue of the journal four days later.  Gage’s account placed responsibility for the 
battle on the “rebels,” whom he claimed fired at the British troops from behind houses 
and brick walls.  Gage reported that he and his men simply carried out orders, destroying 
colonial stores of weapons and supplies.  He emphasized the number of British casualties 
that resulted from the Battles of Concord and Lexington, but did not describe the 
colonists’ actions in great detail, beyond their various geographic positions throughout 
the skirmish.  Gage did not make any mention of the supposed atrocities that the British 
soldiers committed against civilians, but stated that, “the detachment marched towards 
Concord, without arriving at any other incident.” 53 For some readers, Gage’s account 
might have seemed the more plausible of the two, but in printing the American account 
first, with its dramatic language and graphic imagery, both the Gazette de Leyde and the 
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Gazette de France introduced the American war as a colonial response to British 
aggression.   
The theme of British aggression continued throughout both papers’ accounts of 
the American Revolution, each making several references to British brutality.  While the 
newspapers published a few British accounts that recounted American brutality against 
the British army, in most cases the British troops were described as the aggressors, 
committing acts of atrocity against civilians.  French readers saw  “the [American] 
inhabitants . . . only suffer.  The murders, the thievery, the rapes, the insults of which 
these [British] troops are guilty, are terrible.” 54 In casting the British troops as the 
aggressors and continually reminding readers of their atrocities, the newspapers 
established that the British troops had, in Guibert’s words, “violated” the Americans’ 
affairs, land, and honor, giving them every reason to “make war.”55 
As if consciously following Guibert’s definition of a citizen army, the Americans, 
as represented in the two gazettes, responded to this attack on their patrie by repelling the 
British armies with “full exertion of [their] power.”  Immediately after reporting the 
outbreak of war with the Battles of Concord and Lexington, both gazettes printed 
abridged versions of the “Declaration of the Causes and the Necessity of Taking up 
Arms,” Congress’s explanation of the violence between British and Provincial troops as 
well as an outline of the conditions necessary for peace.  Like Guibert’s citizen soldier 
who, “with firm resolution [does] not lay down his weapons until he has been paid 
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reparation in proportion to the offense,”56 Congress declared the American people 
“unanimously resolved to die as free men rather than to live in slavery . . .We do not fight 
for vain glory nor for conquest.  We will cease hostilities when hostilities have ceased on 
the part of the aggressors . . . but not before.”57 The American conflict fit Guibert’s 
parameters for citizen warfare perfectly; citizens, not mercenaries or conscripts, were 
taking up arms against an invading army to protect their cherished homeland.   
In protecting their homeland, the Americans appeared to use all of their resources 
to repel their enemy, including manpower, finances, and supplies.  The Gazette de 
France reported that out of a population of 2,400,000 people, 600,000 men, or one 
colonist of every four, participated in either the American army or local militia.58 Even 
Quakers, a community of pacifists, reportedly constituted their own company of 
soldiers.59 The remaining members of society contributed to the war effort by making 
saltpeter for gunpowder or clothing for the soldiers.60 In Maryland, any person who 
“refused to contribute arms or ammunition was regarded as an enemy of America and 
would have his name printed in the [local] gazette,” demonstrating that the Americans 
expected their fellow citizens to contribute to the war effort.61 On an illustrative note, 
the Gazette de France published a letter from American General Lee to British General 
Burgoyne, informing him that “it would not be an exaggeration to say that all the boats in 
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the world would not suffice to transport the forces . . . of three million men, unanimously 
resolved to sacrifice all for liberty.”62 From reading these reports, educated Frenchmen 
saw that all men able to carry arms were actively fighting against the British, that the 
remaining citizens who did not carry arms were busily working to support and supply the 
colonial troops, and that all citizens were willing to sacrifice their lives and their fortunes 
for the cause of liberty.  Indeed, according to the reports of the papers, the entire “nation” 
of America was at war.   
The newspapers further indicated that, even before the colonies united in a 
movement of independence against the mother country, they provided military support 
for each other and treated attacks on specific colonies as attacks on the colonies as a 
whole.  Shortly after the battles of Lexington and Concord, the Gazette de Leyde reported 
that Connecticut “offered 10,000 men to New York” in preparation for the ensuing 
British attack.63 In 1777, once the war was well under way, American soldiers busily 
attempting to replace lost supplies from their magazines in Danburg and Ridgefield, 
“received much help from the other colonies.”64 In reporting the American war, both 
newspapers emphasized a feeling of unity and mutual support among the colonies.  
Unlike France, in which Paris was the center of the nation and all other provinces were 
literally and figuratively on the periphery, these examples demonstrated a strong level of 
communication throughout the colonies, as well as a sincere concern for fellow citizens 
and a willingness to help.  To borrow from Guibert’s depiction of citizen-soldiers, these 
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reports of mutual aid and support presented a view of the Americans as “contented 
citizens interested in defending their prosperous state.”65 The colonists were cooperative 
rather than competitive, willing to selflessly defend different provinces in order to aid and 
protect fellow citizens. 
Accounts of the American soldiers in combat, which the gazettes gathered from 
some of General Gage’s letters to Britain, portrayed distinct differences in strategy and 
tactics when compared to the European method of warfare.  Rather than meet the British 
army on the battlefield and fight along traditional limits of line warfare, Washington was 
“content to harass [British] troops and refuse[d] to engage.”66 As both gazettes reported, 
Washington further bent the rules of European warfare during the Battle of Trenton, in 
which he crossed the Delaware River on Christmas Eve with about 4,000 troops pulled 
from the army and various militias, and surprised a group of Hessians encamped at 
Trenton on Christmas morning.  According to both gazettes, the engagement resulted in 
the death or capture of hundreds of Hessians at no cost to the American army.67 In this 
thoroughly reported battle, Washington broke with European tradition by fighting in 
winter, when combat usually stopped for the entire season.  As Guibert had suggested to 
French officers in the Essai, Washington’s officers, well-versed in the shape and scope of 
the landscape, used the geography of the battle grounds to their advantage.68 Certainly a 
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citizen army could employ this non-European tactic, because citizens of the country 
understood how to use the land formations to maximize the effectiveness of guerilla 
warfare.  The major battles of the American Revolution did conform more closely to 
European style fighting, yet the gazettes reported more frequently on Washington’s 
unconventional strategy of attrition and guerilla warfare, which they presented as largely 
successful.69 “The Provincial [army] continually harass [British] troops on their march 
with sudden attacks . . . unanticipated in the woods, the gorges, which America is full of, 
and against which this army cannot present an extended front.”70 Again, as though 
keeping with Guibert’s description of citizen armies, the American military practiced a 
more “natural” style of warfare.71 
Aside from non-traditional military practices, the gazettes reported that 
Americans defeated British troops, because as citizens, they were personally invested in 
the war and its outcome.  They fought for their homes, their families, and their personal 
liberties.  Beyond the cause of liberty and their rights, which appeared most often in the 
newspapers as the principal motives for the American war, the Americans fought for their 
“dear wives, and children, these tender objects of [their] solicitude, but also the millions 
of [their] descendants not yet born . . .”72 At the same time, the newspapers portrayed the 
Americans as willing to sacrifice all of their worldly goods and security for the American 
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cause.  The Gazette de France reported that in Charleston, citizens resolved to burn their 
town rather than leave it to supply and house the British soldiers.73 The Gazette de Leyde 
described the Americans as “more resolved than ever to defend their liberty at the price 
of their lives and all that is dear to them.”74 Guibert noted in his Essai that the penalties 
in the ancient world for losing a war—enslavement or death—were frightening enough in 
themselves to motivate ancient Greek and Roman soldiers to fight.  Reports of America 
displayed the same consequences for the Americans—slaves under the British, 
destruction of their homes, death of their families—if they failed to win this war.75 
Because of the geographic and chronological distance between American events 
and the corresponding reports in the newspapers, and because the newspapers relied on 
resolutions, letters, and secondary reports as the basis of their news, often a relatively 
bleak American event could, by the time the report reached the newspapers, appear to the 
French readers as a great success or triumph over adversity.  The Gazette de Leyde, for 
example, printed a series of letters and resolutions from Congress pleading with citizens 
to join either the American army or militia.  These resolutions appealed to the personal 
and cultural aspects of the war, discussing the safety of wives and children, the protection 
of property, the inevitable destruction of a British invasion in a particular town or colony, 
as well as the desire to live in liberty and enjoy the rights “accorded to [them] by 
heaven.”76 A critical reader might see these resolutions as a failure on the citizens’ part 
to rise and meet the enemy.  Yet shortly after the gazette printed these calls for help, it 
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reported huge rises in the number of troops in Washington’s army.  After recounting the 
overwhelming response to this appeal for more soldiers, the paper reported 99,000 troops 
in the army, with an additional 47,600 available for “occasional needs.”77 In responding 
to their government’s call to arms, the Americans exhibited the solidarity between 
government and people, which according to Guibert was necessary for a successful 
citizen army.  This series of articles illustrates the optimistic interpretation the gazettes 
spun when reporting American news.  A war that historically had many unsuccessful 
moments was actually represented in a continual positive light in these newspapers.   
 In short, as portrayed by the gazettes, the American war matched Guibert’s 
definition of a citizen army in nearly every aspect: the citizens were invested in the 
outcome of the war, fought for a just government, were united in a common cause, and 
motivated by patriotism.  As a result, they were waging a successful war against one of 
the most powerful armies in Europe that had defeated the French army just thirteen years 
before during the Seven Years’ War.  As a perfect illustration of this citizen warfare, the 
Gazette de Leyde printed a story of the Connecticut militia, which was desperate for more 
troops.  When the governor appealed to men who had extensive families, and thus were 
exempted from military service, they responded en masse. According to the newspaper, 
most of these men were elderly members of the gentry class.  As instructed, they formed 
units, elected their own officers, trained, and prepared to enter battle.   The reporter for 
the Gazette extolled these men: “The example of these respectable citizens proves to 
what degree patriotism raises their hearts, and how difficult it will be to subjugate a 
people, in which the vast majority know how to sacrifice their familial ties and their most 
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valued personal interests, to save the patrie in danger.”78 As if they were enacting 
Guibert’s text, the Americans proved that having patriotism driving military action 
resulted in esprit, morality, and military success. 
 The gazettes were further attuned to the Americans’ domestic political culture, 
which consisted of festivals celebrating their independence and commemorating their 
fallen comrades.  Perhaps the most extravagant reports of patriotism, which the French 
reformers must have read with jealous eyes, appeared in September of 1777, when the 
papers recounted how the Americans celebrated the first anniversary of the signing of the 
Declaration of Independence.  In Boston, the Fourth of July was “celebrated . . . with all 
the enthusiasm that can inspire a fête that recognizes the liberty of Republican souls.”79 
The Gazette de Leyde reported that all thirteen colonies, “broke publicly and gloriously 
the sword which Britain had forged for them; and generously took back the rights that 
God and Nature had accorded to mankind.”80 Both newspapers reported the memorials 
that the army dedicated to their fallen soldiers and officers.81 Anytime the Americans 
answered the needs of their fellow citizens, from sewing shirts to fighting in the battle of 
Trenton, they actively demonstrated patriotism as their primary motivation in fighting the 
war.  As the newspapers recounted, the soldiers and officers of the army and militias had 
occupations other than soldiering—most were farmers or artisans.  The pay for soldiering 
was minimal; Congress did not even raise taxes in these early years to fund the military, 
and some of the wealthier officers provided, of their own volition, money for supplies.  
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Unlike European soldiers, it was not these citizens’ profession to fight, yet the Americans 
demonstrated a great “ardor for battle.”82 As General Howe penned in one of his letters 
printed in the Gazette de France, “we offered peace to the Americans, who immediately 
prepared for battle and offered us combat.”83 In reading about the Revolutionary War, 
French officers would have perceived the extent to which the Americans’ self-conscious 
patriotism realistically supplied both a moral officer corps and military efficiency. 
In reporting on the character and success of American warfare, the Gazette de 
Leyde reprinted several resolutions from Congress, demonstrating how a nation formed 
and organized an army of volunteers and militias.   In these resolutions, the American 
Congress detailed all the specifics involved in a citizen army, including the appropriate 
ages of the volunteers (between 16 and 50), the number and ranks of the officers, and the 
necessary equipment.  According to these resolutions, soldiers in the militia elected their 
officers who then received their commissions from provincial assemblies.  These 
resolutions enumerated the equipment, training schedules, uniforms, and compensation 
for the soldiers necessary for maintaining a citizen army. An elite group of the militia 
would serve as minutemen, and additional resolutions provided details for the training of 
these soldiers.84 The Gazette de Leyde further published the army regulations, 
enumerating how the army was organized, who nominated the officers, how soldiers were 
compensated for their service, and many other such practical details.85 Though the 
fledging United States improvised many of their military guidelines, they provided a 
 
82 Gazette de France, July 5, 1776. 
 
83 Gazette de France, December 15, 1777. 
 
84 Gazette de Leyde, February 14, 1775. 
 
85 Gazette de Leyde, February 21, 1777. 
41
concrete example of a centralized system that oversaw all military policies, modeling for 
France the kind of “central system” necessary for an effective citizen army. 
 In contrast to the French army, the two gazettes presented the American officers 
as homegrown patriots, whose concern for their country informed their leadership. 
Because America did not have a traditional nobility, social rank did not necessarily 
influence military rank.  The gazettes printed a few brief biographies of some of the 
officers, enough to give the impression that high-ranking officers of the American 
military had a great deal of experience or expertise, earned the respect of their soldiers 
and fellow citizens, and merited their rank.  Few of these officers considered themselves 
military men for life, but French readers would have associated them with Cincinnatus; 
the officers of the American army were not professional soldiers, but qualified citizens.  
Generals Sullivan, Putnam, and Gates received accolades from the newspapers, while 
General Washington embodied every virtue of the perfect officer.  Because these officers 
could not expect a rise in social rank or a promotion at court to result from their time as 
officers, the gazettes inferred that they served out of patriotism. 
Though these homegrown, high-ranking American officers seemed a far cry from 
the upper nobility of the French military, the newspapers also presented more genteel 
aspects of the Americans that must have seemed comforting and familiar to the noble 
Frenchmen.  The Gazette de France reported an instance in which American General 
Gates hosted a formal dinner party for British General Burgoyne.  Although a board 
sitting on two barrels served as a dining table, and the meal consisted of watered down 
rum and very plain fare from the officers’ mess, both gentlemen enjoyed each other’s 
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company and ended the meal toasting their countries and leaders.86 This instance would 
have resonated with French officers, for whom ceremony and protocol often overcame 
national differences.  General Howe recounted in a letter how British General Gage and 
his family (who accompanied him to America) did not have sufficient food until 
American General Putnam learned of their condition and “sent Mrs. Gage a quarter of 
freshly killed veal.”87 These actions demonstrated that the Americans were more than 
mere backwoods fighters who believed in their country’s cause—they had goodwill, good 
manners, and good taste, and they recognized the class distinctions in the British army by 
demonstrating a level of deference and politeness to high-ranking British officers.  The 
Americans might practice an entirely different form of warfare from the French, but these 
glimpses of American gentility demonstrated that the Americans were not wholly 
divorced from European manners.   
 Contrasting these glimpses of European delicacy, American soldiers appeared, 
according to the newspaper accounts, prepared and eager for combat.  The newspapers 
attributed the soldiers’ abilities to the citizens’ natural, even Spartan inclination to fight.  
Whereas most of the French soldiers were poorly trained and exercised, the Americans 
appeared naturally hardy, accustomed to “the excessive heat” or cold of their 
environment, as well as to local diseases.88 One paper described the army as a group “of 
men, who, from their childhood, are accustomed to work, [and] firing a rifle in good 
manner.”89 So ingrained was the importance of warfare in American culture that they 
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prepared for their duty as citizen soldiers from infancy, being educated in weaponry and 
acculturated to constant hard work.  Patriotism provided the greatest motivation for these 
troops, for it was patriotism that inspired the citizens to mobilize these skills in the 
defense of their country.  These traits were highlighted on the battlefield, as the majority 
of the battle accounts depicted the troops’ “love of combat.”90 British letters stated that 
“the Americans equal our soldiers in courage,” they triumphed despite “inconceivable 
exhaustion,” and even Washington reported that the militia “assembled in the most 
courageous manner, firmly resolved to . . . give us as much aid as possible.”91 So 
prevalent were examples of Sparta in French reform literature, that readers would have 
filtered these accounts through that frame of reference, evoking images of the ancient 
Greek warriors fighting on American soil.92 
The newspapers began explicitly referring to the Americans as ancients by the end 
of 1777, as America and France drew closer and closer to a military alliance.  General 
Washington in particular received praise, being compared to the “great men of antiquity” 
for his willingness to defend and make sacrifices for his country.93 Concerning the 
American army as a whole, the Gazette de Leyde reported the military men as possessing 
“the most noble motives . . . their common goal is liberty, the same principle directed the 
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armies of Rome in the days of their glory . . .”94 The French had already associated the 
ancients with military excellence, and in his Essai, Guibert had extolled the ancients for 
their virtues in warfare, both in combat and in their military structure.  Such a perception 
of the Americans proved that it was still possible to achieve the military superiority of the 
Romans, and that citizen warfare was the key for doing so. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
A MONARCHICAL AFFAIRE WITH THE REPUBLICAN ARMY 
 
Les Affaires de l’Angleterre et de l’Amérique 
 The extent to which the image of Americans as citizen warriors saturated 
educated society is evident in the Affaires de l’Angleterre et de l’Amérique, a newspaper 
used by the French government to garner support for the American war against Britain. 95 
Though the paper was primarily a propaganda tool, the editors disguised it as an impartial 
gazette by portraying it as a French-language periodical printed in Antwerp, much like 
the Gazette de Leyde. The Comte de Vergennes, France’s minister of foreign affairs, 
heavily subsidized the paper and oversaw its publication in Paris.   Edmé-Jaques Genêt, a 
zealous advocate of the American cause, edited the paper and received several written 
contributions from Benjamin Franklin and John Adams, who were in France negotiating 
for military aid.96 They supplied the periodical with copies of the Declaration of 
Independence, state constitutions, and letters and reports from American newspapers that
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themes of the Affaires can be found in August W. Eberle, “The American Revolution in the Affaires de 
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were often reprinted in full.  Franklin not only supplied materials from America, but he 
wrote some of the ‘articles’ himself.97 In addition to these contributions, the paper 
included transcripts of several debates in the British parliament, articles from the British 
newspaper The Remembrancer, and the letters from “a London banker to M. *** in 
Antwerp,” which usually described recent events from the war that heavily favored the 
Americans.  The paper dealt primarily with issues of commerce, but the few articles that 
reported news of the actual war extolled the American army for its virtue and military 
prowess to a greater degree than the other two gazettes. That the monarchy would so 
heavily emphasize the success of a perceived Republican army and disparage the British 
army, fighting for a monarch, revealed the broader effects of the American image on the 
French government and European elite. 
 As portrayed by the Affaires, the British army suffered from some of the same 
shortcomings as the French, especially difficulties in recruiting soldiers and the 
problematic necessity of hiring mercenaries. One article reported that Lord Shelburne, in 
recognizing the difficulty of recruiting soldiers in Britain, suggested that Parliament “give 
the troops certain pleasures (douceurs)” that were still compatible with military discipline 
as an incentive for more people to join the army.  He suggested, “engaging troops for a 
limited number of years as they do in France,” instead of for life.98 While this passage 
might have assured the French officers of the weakness of their archenemies, it also 
revealed that the British army suffered from the familiar problem of insufficient 
patriotism.   
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Further projecting French military anxieties on the British army, the Affaires 
reported heavily on the British army’s reliance on mercenaries, which placed them in the 
same camp as the French military, debating the moral and practical costs and benefits of 
paying foreign professional soldiers.  When the Revolutionary War began, the British 
government contracted several thousand German mercenaries to supplement their forces 
in America.  In what appears to be a transcript of a debate in Parliament concerning the 
use of Hessians in the American war, the Affaires reported Lord Shelburne’s critique of 
employing mercenaries and the “machine fighting” that resulted. 99 Other members of 
Parliament were concerned over the cost of the Hessians, their likely fraternization with 
German-speaking colonists in Pennsylvania, and the image of Britain abroad if she could 
not supply her own troops.100 In arguing against mercenaries, Shelburne himself alluded 
to Guibert’s Essai:
Doubtless, few of you know a French book on the Tactique, the one that 
appeared in Paris.  It is there that you would see the pitiful mechanism of 
foreign military discipline.  There, you would learn to judge the 
inadequacy of a similar aid, by the difference in bravery between the 
soldiers who fight for their liberty and their possessions, and the machines 
for whom merit consists solely of maneuvers and who fight without the 
least interest in the quarrel of the Prince who pays them.101 
Regardless of whether or not Lord Shelburne actually spoke these words to his fellow 
members of Parliament, in printing this speech, the Affaires offered a stunning portrayal 
of the British Parliament criticizing its own military according to the terms of a French 
tactical essay.  During the eighteenth century, most of the written works on warfare were 
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in French; Britain had very few military manuals, but works by Marshal de Saxe and 
Marquis de Feuquières comprised the reading list of high-ranking officers in most of 
Europe’s militaries.102 Lord Shelburne’s ideas about mercenaries revealed how 
widespread and accepted Guibert’s essay had become in Europe, and further supported 
the French papers’ portrayal of the American military as a citizen army.  The British 
Parliament appeared to recognize the difference in the level of fighting when soldiers 
fought for personal reasons or beliefs rather than for the whim of a monarch.  The 
Americans, a people fighting for their own interests, would fight more effectively than 
the Hessian mercenaries interested only in being paid.  The idea of a citizen army, which 
the French described in writing and which the Americans enacted on the battlefield, was 
not a mere French fancy but an idea that shook traditional military thinking.   
Shelburne’s concerns about the Hessians were confirmed in one of the accounts of 
the battle of Trenton (the Affaires contains several brief accounts of this battle from 
different letters and articles).  According to an article that first appeared in England,  
We must agree that the Rebels comported themselves in a manner that 
gives us a very different opinion of them than the one we had until now; 
and unfortunately, the Hessians and some other foreign troops acted in a 
way that gives us grounds to think differently of them.  It is certain that 
Congress did not neglect any method for debauching them; that they put 
down their arms at the first attack and only seven men killed; that they 
were received in Philadelphia more like friends than enemies; that they 
marched down the main streets of Philadelphia, drums beating and flags 
flying.103 
Lord Shelburne’s fears about mercenaries were prophetic.  If Britain’s hired troops 
fraternized with the Americans instead of fighting them, then the Americans should be 
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able to win their battles against the mercenaries with relative ease.  This incidence also 
drew a contrast between the mercenaries’ motivation (or lack thereof) and the colonists’ 
motivation to defend their homes and families.  Congress’ role in “debauching” the 
mercenaries suggested here that the Americans knew full well that mercenaries were 
eminently corruptible. This view of mercenaries complemented French military reform 
literature of the period. The British army, which used the same military texts and used 
similar methods of employment on the battlefield as the French, appeared inadequate 
because of lack of patriotism and military motivation.  This military might have been a 
match for the French army, suffering from the same problems and fighting in a similar 
manner during the Seven Years’ War, but could not succeed when pitched against a 
citizen army. 
Just as the gazettes cast the British troops in the role of villainous conquerors of 
the virtuous Americans, the Affaires portrayed the British army, which closely resembled 
the French military, as even moral brutal.  According to the Affaires, the British troops 
came to America for two purposes: to destroy American freedoms and to terrorize and 
torture the populace.  One letter reprinted from Philadelphia declared the British were 
“deaf to the voice of reason and humanity, and inflexibly set on devastation and war.”104 
The Affaires later published a letter from the Chamber of Representatives of Boston to 
George Washington, describing the British as “violent and oppressive” who “attacked . . . 
the liberty of America.”  From these reports, one would gather that the British troops 
specifically targeted the American way of life and attempted to destroy American virtue.  
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One report even speculated that the entire reason behind the war was “the animosity of 
certain English against the Americans.”105 
Such animosity played out in the British army’s violence against civilians, and the 
Affaires was replete with reports of “the enormous excesses committed by the King’s 
troops on the inhabitants of America.”106 One letter detailed that “our virtuous children 
are massacred and our houses destroyed by the British troops.”107 The most frequently 
reported act of British atrocity, usually accompanying pillaging and burning villages, was 
the rape of American women and young girls.  According to a letter written by a 
“distinguished officer in the America army,” one American civilian saw the “rape of his 
wife, as well as his ten-year-old daughter.”  The British soldiers then chased several other 
young women through the woods, and the letter reported a rather graphic sexual assault 
of a thirteen-year-old girl.  Yet another story followed a father who was shot while trying 
to save his daughter from becoming another victim of British lust.108 Even the American 
loyalists appeared to “conspire barbarous and infernal plots” against American patriots.109 
While the other gazettes reported British atrocities as well, their focus seemed to be 
destruction of property and death of innocent civilians, and the language of their reports 
was much less precise.  The Affaires continually described specific instances of British 
brutality in vivid, inflated language, which may have intended to elicit a much more 
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emotional response from its readers and even inspire righteous outrage against the 
British. 
 In describing the role of the British troops and hired mercenaries, the editors of 
the Affaires left readers with a distinct impression of the British forces as weak and 
barbaric.  While England and France were notorious rivals, this unmerciful description of 
them levied a harsh critique of European military practices.  Against a citizen army, the 
British military, designed to practice limited warfare in an enlightened manner, proved 
ineffective in combat and committed horrible atrocities more reminiscent of the 
seventeenth-century religious wars.  Because they shared many of the same military 
characteristics, in condemning the British military, the French government was implicitly 
criticizing their own.  The reform literature of the eighteenth century had penetrated the 
French government to such a degree that it did not recognize the implications of 
criticizing a monarch-supported military. 
In stark contrast to the British military, the Affaires also presented the American 
military, the citizen army, as the epitome of virtue.  As with the British army, the 
language describing the American military was much more melodramatic than in the 
other gazettes, appealing to the French concept of Americans as the virtuous harbingers 
of liberty and righteousness.  In promoting the American military organization, the 
Affaires also promoted the Republican values that were incompatible with a monarchy. 
 When describing the American military in action, the Affaires only reported on 
the larger, more significant battles of the American Revolution, such as Quebec, Trenton, 
and Saratoga, rather than the smaller skirmishes.  Unlike the other gazettes, which 
provided detailed accounts of the troop movements during the battles, these reports 
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highlighted the daring conduct of the military men involved.  The Affaires’ account of 
Quebec featured the tragic death of General Montgomery, who “received the fatal blow 
while marching with a battery of cannon,” and the heroic conduct of General Arnold who 
commanded in his stead.  The Affaires described General Arnold as a “brave man, 
mourning the loss of General Montgomery.”  During the battle, Arnold became 
“overwhelmed by the British army’s superior numbers,” and “after three hours of the 
most vigorous resistance,” in which he received “a dangerous blow to his leg,” Arnold 
withdrew with his troops a few miles from Quebec.  Following the battle, Arnold wrote a 
letter to Congress, saying, “Providence, who brought me here through so many dangers 
and saw to my protection, is my sole support.  I am in my place, performing my duty: I 
feel no fear.”  The reporter writing this story then assessed Arnold’s retreat (and defeat), 
not as a loss, but as “a wise defensive.” 110 
Arnold’s case study created the impression that the American generals were in the 
thick of the battle, fighting with their men, enduring hardships and injury with 
courageous fortitude.  Arnold’s reliance on Providence gave the American cause a 
righteous tone, and the reporters’ assessment of the battle promoted the Americans’ 
military competence.  Most importantly, Arnold retreated, not because of the British 
army’s superior skills or tactics, but because of their superior numbers.  According to this 
battle account, the American army was a competent and capable military that lacked only 
a sufficient number of men to defeat the British. 
 Although the Affaires noted an insufficient number of men at the Battle of 
Quebec, other articles indicated that this was not due to a lack of participation among the 
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colonists.  The Affaires, like the other gazettes, reported inflated numbers of colonists 
who participated in the army or militia with zeal and skill. One account refuted the notion 
that American soldiers were “without discipline,” and described them as a group of “fifty 
thousand powerful men, who reduced, during their first campaign, an army just as 
formidable.”111 The Affaires dispelled rumors of desertion from the American army by 
describing the deserters’ “most sincere repentance,” and celebrating General 
Washington’s “new recruits . . . a great number [of whom]  enlisted for the duration of 
the war.”112 According to the Affaires, the fact that these soldiers were citizens fighting 
in defense of their own country only increased their participation.  The British army’s 
“hostile invasion . . . inspire[d] an ardent love for [the colonists’] Patrie.”113 One of the 
letters from the mysterious London banker concluded that the colonies “will not be 
conquered” by Britain, because “the activity of the officer and the bravery of the soldier 
will render [Americans] invincible.”  The citizens’ “war-like virtue must shine.”114 As 
the war progressed, the troops “redouble[d] their zeal and ardor” for their cause, 
undeterred by losses.115 
The officers of the American army were as equally zealous and skilled as the 
citizen soldiers.  The Affaires presented detailed accounts of the most prominent 
American army officers, illustrating their virtues and abilities.  General Warren, 
according to a speech by Benjamin Franklin, had “all the talents and virtues of a great 
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man, of a patriot, of a [Roman] senator, and a hero.”  Such values seemed to inspire 
others to join the army to defend these virtues, as the speech ended with Franklin calling 
on all “brave defenders of liberty and glory.”116 George Washington received similar 
treatment from the Affaires, which printed a letter that addressed him as a “man of great 
capacity in the art of war.”  Washington’s response to this letter, as printed in the 
periodical, was a humble recognition of his attempts to “contribute to the establishment 
of liberty and peace,” for which he “applauds . . . all virtuous citizens.”  More so than the 
other gazettes, the Affaires presented patriotism, competent officers, and motivated 
soldiers as inextricably linked.  Very little of the information from the Affaires differed in 
content from the information found in the other two gazettes, but accounts of American 
patriotism and skill are more embellished in the Affaires than in the other papers.  
According to the Affaires, Americans were synonymous with the virtue, honor, and 
patriotism that the French army considered to be their own values but that they did not 
fulfill.  
The Affaires’ presentation of the Americans as “invincible,” replete with “war-
like virtue,” provided a stark contrast against the more traditional British military that 
shared so many traits with the French.  While it is unlikely that the French government 
purposely used the British and American militaries as a means of self-criticism, by 
disparaging the traits in the British military that the French shared and contrasting the 
brutality of the British against the virtue of the Americans, the Affaires had dangerous 
implications for the monarchy.  Furthermore, the support that the monarchy gave to a 
citizen army, which would be harmful to its power and structure, indicated the level to 
which reform rhetoric and excitement about the America’s citizen-army penetrated even 
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the highest levels of French society.  In France and other parts of Europe, the American 
citizen army was not a fad, but a reality.  
 
Saratoga 
In September and October of 1777, after reporting on small skirmishes or 
unsuccessful large-scale battles between the American and British armies, the Gazette de 
France, Gazette de Leyde, and the Affaires de l’Angleterre et de l’Amérique printed 
extensive coverage on the Battle of Saratoga, a large, two-part engagement in which the 
American troops emerged victorious.  The articles describing this engagement 
emphasized the tenacity and discipline of the troops and the bold leadership style of the 
officers, proving to the French that the Americans’ citizen army could defeat the British 
army in a more traditional European battle.  As presented in the newspapers, this battle 
was the culmination of a long period of trial and error for the American forces.  All 
papers ran extremely thorough accounts of the fighting, detailing specifically which 
troops moved where at what time, allowing the educated French reader to fully appreciate 
American tactics and execution.  This engagement finally proved to the French 
government that the Americans were indeed winning the war against the British, and in 
February of 1778, the French agreed to send military aid to the United States. 
CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
When the American Revolution broke out in 1775, it immediately attracted the 
attention of French military officers who kept abreast of the latest developments by 
reading the Gazette de France, the Gazette de Leyde, or both. Some, like Lafayette, 
responded enthusiastically to the American cause of liberty and equality, and sailed to 
America, ready to defend her against the oppressors.  Other officers responded by 
volunteering as well, but were not nearly as interested in the causes behind the American 
Revolution as the opportunities the American war presented.  Most of the officers who 
read these reports stayed in France, but undoubtedly they watched the American army 
with a close eye, interested to see how this new form of citizen warfare interacted and 
compared with traditional European warfare.  The French might not have been so 
intrigued by the American war had their own military been more efficient and their 
officers more virtuous.  Because the French officers and men of letters were concerned 
with severe problems in the French military, the American Revolution took on a special 
meaning, appearing to employ citizen warfare, a type of warfare in which the French 
were particularly interested.  In reading about the formation, nature, and performance of 
the American military, the French officers watched a new Rome rise across the Atlantic, 
buoyed by patriotism.  
 Gilbert Bodinier argues that with the exception of Lafayette, officers who showed 
any interest in the American Revolution were acting on their own selfish desire for glory 
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and distinction, not for any greater cause.  Examining newspaper representations of the 
American army suggests, however, that these volunteers may have sailed to America with 
military ideals, desiring to fight with an army that had managed to circumvent the 
problems that beset their own.  
 Reading the two gazettes suggests that the American image appealed to the 
French officers for two reasons.  The first reason involves the context of the military 
problems in France during the 1770s in which officers who did not have personal 
connections at court or in the higher ranks of the military remained trapped in lower 
ranks with little opportunity for advancement.  For these frustrated officers, the American 
Revolution, a war in a rare moment of European peace, presented an opportunity for them 
to have greater leadership roles   and distinguish themselves in combat.  Especially since 
France had not been involved in a European conflict since the Seven Years’ War, many 
of the younger officers expressed an eagerness to prove themselves on the battlefield. 
 Yet for the majority of the French officers, who remained in France throughout 
the entire course of the American Revolution, the American war was intriguing because 
at a time when military officials and men of letters questioned the army’s effectiveness in 
battle and looked to renew the military’s values, America provided a laboratory setting in 
which to test an emergent military theory, citizen warfare.  From the perspective of these 
French officers, the organization of the American military, its system of command, 
citizen-soldiers, and methods of maintaining an army and militia appeared as solutions to 
French military problems of unqualified officers, poorly trained troops, and overall lack 
of organization.  
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On an even deeper level, the American military enacted the values of virtue, 
patriotism, and honor, which many believed that the French nobility had lost and needed 
to regain.  Just as Guibert insisted that patriotism was the root of military success, the 
American military appeared to draw its support chiefly from the patriotism of the citizens 
and managed to form an effective fighting force that successfully combated the British 
army, one of the most celebrated armies in Europe.  With little formal military 
experience, the Americans reportedly reinvigorated warfare with the values that formed 
the base of successful fighting: virtue, honor, and patriotism.  
 Studies of military relations between the American and French militaries typically 
focus on the experience of Rochambeau and his small band of officers and troops, who 
spent three years in America and fought in only one engagement.  The larger impact of 
the American military can be found in these newspapers, which reached the vast majority 
of French officers and educated elites who were already highly sensitized to the factors 
that made for a successful military.  In focusing on the American image as depicted in the 
gazettes and Affaires, and framed in the context of French military reform, perhaps we 
can better understand the connection between the American and French Revolutions.  
American Revolutionary principles did not sail back to France with Rochambeau, his 
army, and a few hundred volunteers, but perhaps the newspaper reports, which 
represented the American military as a model for citizen warfare, seduced a society 
already aware of its own military shortcomings and eager for reform. 
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